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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOR B. ROUNDY, an individual,

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Appellate Court No. 970568CA

REZA SEMNANI, an individual,

Argument Priority
Classification No. 15

Defendant and Appellee.
Appeal from the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, Division II,
Judge Barrett

FILED
DEC 1 8 1997
COURT OF APPEALS
Richard Hackwell
Attorney for Appellee
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Bldg.
68 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellant
230 South 500 East
Suite 270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ARGUMENT
I,
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT PORTION OF
THE TRIAL C O U R T S JUDGMENT FROM WHICH APPEAL IS TAKEN.
Although appellee argues that there is ample evidence to
support the trial court's judgment, appellee fails to identify any
evidence that supports that portion of the trial court's judgment
from which appeal is taken.

Instead, appellee elects to give two

examples, discussed below, and to imply that other evidence would
also support the trial court's judgment.

Appellee's failure to

identify evidence supporting the trial court's judgment is
demonstrative of the lack thereof.
Appellee's first example involves a finding of fact which is
not disputed on appeal.

The trial court found that the written

fee agreement presented at trial was not signed by defendant
Semnani.

The trial court found that the plaintiff Mr. Roundy had

commenced representation of Mr. Semnani with the belief that the
written fee agreement governed the relationship between the
parties, but that defendant Semnani believed that there was a
verbal agreement.

[Transcript from the Trial Court's decision

rendered March 13, 1997 (hereinafter "T2"), pp. 4:2-23, Record,
pp. 898.]
Said finding was set forth on page 6 of appellant's brief in
the statement of facts.

Said finding is not disputed.

Appellant

is not requesting that the trial court should have found the
existence of a written fee agreement.
1

Instead, the appellant

disputes on appeal that there was any evidence that would support
the trial court's finding that the parties subsequently entered
into a verbal contingency fee agreement.
Appellee's second example involves the correspondence which
was presented in detail and in total in appellant's brief.

In

contrast, appellee makes only cursory references to the
correspondence.

The correspondence speaks for itself.

The

correspondence consists of argument among the parties as to the
terms of the attorney-client fee arrangement between them.

The

correspondence establishes that the fee dispute was never
resolved.
Appellee also fails to address the absence of any verbal
testimony at trial by defendant Semnani that the parties ever
resolved the fee dispute!

Neither of the parties testified that

they entered into an oral fee arrangement at the time of the
correspondence.

Neither party testified that the correspondence

in any way reflected reaching a resolution.

Defendant wholly

failed to elicit any testimony from either Mr. Roundy or defendant
Semnani that the parties had agreed to anything at the time of the
correspondence.
to the contrary.

On the other hand, Mr. Roundy testified in detail
[Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter "Tl"),

pp. 62:20-63:10, 64:4-65:5, 77:15-78:15, 80:24-87:11, 148:19149:6, 152:12-25, Record, pp. 766-769, 781-782, 784-791, 852-853,
856.]

See page 8 of appellant's brief in the statement of facts,
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paragraph 8.

Everything stated by Mr. Roundy in the

correspondence is based on his intention and belief that the
written contract should be enforced pursuant to its terms.
As a matter of law, a contract cannot be imposed upon the
plaintiff absent evidence that there was a meeting of the minds.
As the evidence demonstrates, Mr. Roundy accepted a settlement
with Miss Clark of $2,250.00 on December 8, 1995.
83:2, Record, pp. 630, 786-787.]

[Tl, pp. 82:13-

Four days later, on December 12,

1995, Mr. Semnani authorized Mr. Roundy to accept that settlement
and a second settlement if Mr. Roundy would in return accept a
one-third contingency fee split. [Tl, p. 83:3-10, Record, p. 633,
787.]

Not only did Mr. Roundy refuse, he could not possibly have

based his acceptance dated December 8, 1995 on an authorization
not made until December 12, 1995!

Yet, this is the only argument

advanced by appellant in support of the trial court's judgment.
As appellee points out, on December 12, 1997, defendant
Semnani sent a facsimile to Mr. Roundy which states that he
received Mr. Roundy's December 7, 1997 letter on December 11,
1997. [Record, pp. 603, 633.]

The letter authorizes Mr. Roundy to

settle the matter with both Miss Clark and Mr. Barkey.

The letter

does not state that Mr. Roundy was authorized to settle with Miss
Clark only.

The letter to does state that Mr. Roundy was earlier

authorized to settle with either defendant on any basis.

The

letter expressly states only that, as of the date of the letter, a
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new authorization to settle is given.

Yet, not only did Mr.

Roundy not follow the direction set forth in the letter, Mr.
Roundy had already settled with Miss Clark only. [Tl, pp. 82:1383:2, Record, pp. 63 0, 786-787.]

Without some testimony from some

witness, in cannot be concluded that the parties had earlier
verbally discussed settlement or resolved the fee dispute between
attorney and client.

Appellee's suggestion is pure speculation

and conjecture unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.

The

remaining correspondence between the parties overwhelmingly
demonstrates the very serious dispute that was continuing between
the parties as to their fee arrangement. [Record, pp. 603, 628646.] Mr. Roundy made efforts to resolve the matter with defendant
Semnani.

Mr. Roundy's letter of January 16, 1996 was one such

effort. [Record, pp. 603, 644.]

Mr. Roundy offered to give

defendant Semnani 2/3 of the settlement with Mr. Barkey as a
settlement.

In the same letter, Mr. Roundy expressly did not

offer any money from the settlement with Miss Clark.

The same

letter also sets forth the alternative enforcement of the terms of
the written fee agreement if Mr. Roundy's settlement offer was not
accepted by defendant Semnani.

Defendant Semnani rejected Mr.

Roundy's settlement offer.
Even if defendant Semnani had made his authorization in
advance of the actual settlement, his authorization would not have
created a contract between the parties.
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It is hornbook law that

one party to a contract cannot unilaterally set the terms of the
contract.

Mr. Roundy flatly refused the notion of a one-third

contingency fee arrangement.
to such a provision.

There is no evidence that he agreed

If clients could cause the modification of

their fee arrangements with lawyers in the fashion employed by
defendant Semnani, every contingency fee client would be
authorizing their attorney to settle only if he agreed to a lower
fee.

Attorney-client relationships would become dysfunctional if

clients were permitted to engage in such manipulation.

In

particular, where the attorney is not agreeable, the client's
effort violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
II,

ALL APPLICABLE

EVIDENCE WAS

MARSHALLED

BY

APPELLANT.

All applicable evidence was marshalled by appellant.
Appellant included in his brief every piece of correspondence,
including those expressly identified by the trial court in support
of its judgment. [See Brief of the Appellant, pp. 9-13, Addendum,
Exhibit UD."]

Appellant also set forth in the statement of facts

the trial court's finding that the parties had not entered into a
binding fee agreement and the evidence in support thereof, even
though that portion of the judgment was not disputed. [See Brief
of the Appellant, pp. 4-6.]

There was no need to provide further

analysis in support of the undisputed portion of the judgment.
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Certainly, appellant's brief contained all of the evidence which
appellee states appellant should have marshalled.
III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE CASE BASED
ON A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT.
The trial court found that the plaintiff had commenced
representation of the defendant with the belief that the written
fee agreement governed the relationship between the parties, but
that the defendant believed that there was a verbal agreement.
[T2, p. 4:12-23, Record, p. 898.]

There was no evidence to

support a finding that the parties subsequently entered into a
verbal one-third contingency fee arrangement, in the heat of their
dispute over the matter.

Therefore, a contract must be implied in

quantum meruit and damages must be determined on a quantum meruit
basis.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT BY EXPRESS DECISION,
THEREFORE

THE

JUDGMENT

CANNOT

BE UPHELD ON THAT BASIS.

The trial court did not consider the theory of quantum
meruit.

The trial court expressly determined that it did not need

to consider the theory of quantum meruit because it had made a
finding of an oral contract.

[T2, p. 6:19-24, Record, p. 900.]

The trial court made no findings of fact concerning the value of
plaintiff Mr. Roundy's legal services or the benefit to defendant
Semnani.
Appellee's suggestion that the trial court judgment might be
upheld on the basis of quantum meruit is ludicrous.
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The judgment

that there was an oral agreement.

If that decision is

overturned, then damages must be determined on the basis of
quantum meruit.

Merely because the ultimate dollar figure might

be the same does not justify upholding an erroneous judgment
without considering the quantum meruit basis for damages.

In

fact, it is virtually impossible that the quantum meruit value of
plaintiff Mr. Roundy's services would be even close to the amount
of the present judgment.
Appellee does not dispute that the Mr. Roundy established at
trial all of the elements for quantum meruit, both for a contract
implied in fact and implied in law.
for a dollar amount.

Instead, appellee only argues

The proper dollar amount is a question,

first, for the trial court.

Nonetheless, appellee's contention

that the benefit to defendant was only one-third of the amount
recovered is logically inconsistent.

Likewise, appellee's

contention that the fair market value of plaintiff's services is
one-third of the amount recovered is entirely inconsistent with
the valuation of an attorney's services made in any other reported
case.

Appellee's argument presumes that an attorney guarantees

some recovery for a client.

Appellee's argument further presumes

that there is no non-economic benefit to representation by an
attorney.

Mr. Roundy's hourly fee of $100 per hour is very common

and a reasonable charge to have an attorney in Salt Lake City
represent a person's economic and non-economic interests.
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Defendant presented no evidence concerning the value of Mr.
Roundy's services.

Defendant Semnani, in fact, testified that he

was advised in writing of Mr. Roundy's hourly rate.
V.

APPELLANT

SHOULD BE AWARDED

COSTS RELATIVE

TO TRIAL.

If Mr. Roundy prevails on this appeal, then there can be no
question that he is the prevailing party entitled to costs.
Nonetheless, Mr. Roundy was also the prevailing party at the
trial court level.

Appellee's brief ignores the fact that earlier

orders were issued against defendant Semnani and in favor of Mr.
Roundy, but which Mr. Roundy obtained relief prayed for in the
complaint prior to the time of trial. [See Order, Record pp. 204209.]

Further, it was only at trial that defendant Semnani

finally changed his plea from one of no payment whatsoever to Mr.
Roundy to a plea for a one-third contingent fee.

Interestingly,

the trial court stated that it was not sure who was the prevailing
party.

[T2, p. 7:9-10, Record, p. 901.]
VI,

APPELLEE SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
RELATIVE TO THIS APPEAL.

FEES

The only piece of evidence referenced by the trial court in
support of the finding that Mr. Roundy agreed to a one-third
contingency fee is the letter of Mr. Roundy, dated December 12,
1995.

[T2, p. 5:20-24, Record, p. 899.] Yet, no reasonable person

could possibly read said letter to support a finding that the
parties had reached an agreement as to attorney fees.
provided:
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The letter

I received your facsimile this evening. I am surprised
by your statement concerning a "verbal agreement." When you
were in my office last, you claimed there was a verbal
agreement for 50 percent of any recovery. Now you are
claiming 33 percent?!
Under paragraph 3 of our written agreement, I am to
receive as an attorney's fee the greater of one third of any
recovery or $100.00 per hour, up to the total amount
recovered. My attorney's fee is not to be reduced by the
retainer provided for in paragraph 1 or by costs and expenses
provided in paragraph 4. The basis for our contract was
fully discussed prior to the commencement of representation.
I have received offers totalling $4,000.00 on your
behalf. I have stated that I am willing to give you
something from the money which you owe me, because I know
that you want some money from the case. I will accept
$2,000.00 as my attorney's fee, despite the tremendous amount
of time I have devoted to your case. That attorney's fee can
be paid from the settlement proceeds from Ms. Clark. You may
receive additional money in settlement from Mr. Barkey.
Whatever money you receive can be yours. However, if you
would like me to continue to assist you, you will need to
agree to pay me $75.00 per hour, beginning December 22, 1995.
My attorney's fees will not be contingency after December 22,
1995. I will bill you each month, and all terms of act other
than paragraph 3 will remain unchanged. If you accept these
terms immediately, I may be able to settle the matter with
Mr. Barkey prior to December 22, 1995, in which case, there
would be no additional attorney's fee unless I also do
additional work after December 22, 1995. Thus, it will be to
your advantage to act as soon as possible so that we can make
a counter-offer to Mr. Barkey. These terms are not open to
negotiation. This offer will expire on December 22, 1995 and
it will be automatically withdrawn if you reject it or
attempt to negotiate further.
[Record, pp. 603, 634-635.]
Similarly, all of the other correspondence clearly
establishes the existence of a conflict, and the absence of an
agreement, between the parties during the time period relative to
the trial court's judgment.

After searching the record, appellant

9

has failed to find any testimony that the parties reached an
agreement concerning attorneys fees during the time period
relative to the trial court's judgment.

Likewise, appellee has

failed to identify a single line of supporting testimony.
Both of the parties testified that they reached a certain
agreement at the commencement of representation, and the Trial
Court expressly found that both parties had different believes and
that no agreement was reached at that time.

[T2, pp. 4:2-23,

Record, pp. 898.] Neither parties testified that they entered into
an agreement of any type during the heat of the correspondence
submitted into evidence as to the end of 1995.

It is a complete

mystery how the trial court came up with its finding that the
parties reached an agreement at that time.
Appellee's request for sanctions is without merit.
has failed to establish that the appeal is frivolous.

Appellee

Appellee's

brief also fails to properly set forth the relevant Rule.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff and Appellant Mr.
Roundy respectfully requests that this Court reverse the holding
of the Trial Court in the case at hand as to the finding of an
oral contract, and direct the Trial Court to enter a judgment for
attorney's fees earned based on Quantum Meruit as discussed
herein, and further direct the Trial Court to award costs to Mr.
Roundy as the prevailing party.
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Respectfully submitted.
DATED this :2s day of December, 1997.

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
Thor B. Roundy
230 South 500 East, Suite 270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Bar No. 6435
I, THOR

B.

ROUNDY,

certify

that

on

this

/ t>

day of

December, 1997, I served two copies of the attached REPLY BRIEF OF
THE APPELLANT, Appellate Court No. 970568CA, upon counsel for the
appellee in this matter by mailing it to him by first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Richard G. Hackwell
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Bldg.
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellant
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